Seminar and Reading Group

During the Fall, Winter, and Spring quarters, the cryptography group meets once a week for a reading group where we read existing research papers and discuss them in detail. We also host seminars less regularly, in which visitors give research talks.

Seminar Speakers

2026-2027

  • Kashvi Gupta

    Peony Onion Encryption: A Construction for Fully Anonymous Communication in the Asynchronous Model

    Abstract: Onion routing is a popular approach to anonymous communication, which asks the essential question— if Alice wishes to speak to Bob on a surveilled network, how does she hide who she is talking to? In onion routing, a message travels through the network via a series of intermediaries, wrapped in layers of encryption to make it difficult to trace.

    While fully anonymous construction and routing protocols exist for the synchronous setting, all are broken in the asynchronous setting (which reflects the realities of network and traffic delays). The only existing construction for the asynchronous setting leaks path-length information ("Bruisable Onions: Anonymous Communication in the Asynchronous Model" Ando, Lysyanskaya, Upfal). We propose a new construction for the asynchronous setting that upholds the security properties proposed in the original onions paper ("Formal Treatment on Onion Routing" Camenisch, Lysyanskaya).

    Based on joint work with Megumi Ando, Miranda Christ, Tal Malkin, and Dane Smith.

    Bio: Kashvi Gupta is a second year PhD student at Tufts University under the supervision of Professor Megumi Ando. Their research interests are in anonymous communication protocols.

  • Lucas Xia

    Limber: Low Overhead SNARKs for Integers from Any PCS

    Abstract: In real-world applications of SNARKs, non-native arithmetic, the emulation of computation outside of the specified SNARK field, is a key bottleneck. It introduces large overheads, and proof system designers often resort to non-standard SNARK-friendly hash-functions or other means like elliptic curve cycles to mitigate its costs. Besides performance concerns, non-native circuit arithmetization is also a major cause of implementation errors. In a collection of 27 critical bugs in real world ZK systems (0xPARC/zkbugtracker), 9 were related to non-native arithmetization.

    We tackle these challenges by constructing a minimal overhead SNARK for integer computation that generically handles non-native arithmetic. We follow the recipe of Zaratan (PKC 26), which proves an integer relation such as a * b = c + u * m by fingerprinting - reducing it to the same relation but over a randomly sampled prime field. Realizing this recipe requires an integer mod-PCS that commits to integer polynomials and opens their evaluations modulo a random prime, which is crucially chosen after the underlying PCS's setup and commitment phases.

    Our central contribution is Limber, the first practical integer mod-PCS construction that asymptotically has o(1) multiplicative commitment overhead and can be instantiated with any standard field polynomial commitment scheme, including ones over small fields. Combining Limber with a PIOP for integer R1CS over the random prime yields our SNARK. We demonstrate its practicality by implementing our scheme and showing that we can prove RSA arithmetic more than 15x faster than prior circuit-based approaches.

    This is joint work with Jessica Chen, Wilson Nguyen, and Benedikt Bünz.

    Bio: Lucas Xia is a second-year PhD student at NYU advised by Benedikt Bünz. His research focuses on verifiable computation, particularly efficient proof system constructions and applications. He previously received an MS in Computer Science from Stanford University and a BS in Computer Science from UCLA.

Calendar

Please see the calendar below for scheduled dates, times, and location.